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Abstract  
The popularity of soda taxes as a public health policy has grown rapidly in the last few years. While 
the evidence that the tax works in reducing the purchases of soda is emerging, there are a number of 
questions that are yet to be answered before the broader effectiveness of this measure can be 
determined. Beyond health effects, there is more specifically a need to better understand the 
economic mechanisms of change, redistributive effects, as well as causal and spillover effects in food 
systems and economy more broadly.   
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Highlights  
 Increasing number of countries are considering or implementing soda taxes 
 Taxes are shown to have reduced purchases of taxed sodas 
 Better understanding is needed on mechanisms driving change, including media framing 
 Taxes incentivising reformulation likely to have different consequences on consumption and 
revenues 
 Health, redistributive and wider economic impacts are yet to be determined 
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Introduction 
In the last few years the list of countries that have implemented a soda tax, or plan to, has grown 
rapidly (see table 1). The popularity of this upstream public health policy, designed to reduce 
consumption of sugar, is exceptional. The first ex-post evaluations suggest soda taxes work in reducing 
purchases of taxed products (see table 2).  In Mexico, the demand for sugary drinks fell by 6-9% in the 
first two years after implementation of a tax that increased price on average by 10% (Colchero et al., 
2017b, Colchero et al., 2015). In Berkley, California, sales data indicated a 9% decline in purchases, 
while self-reported changes in consumption amounted to a 21% reduction of taxed sodas (Falbe et al., 
2016, Silver et al., 2017). In Finland, Hungary and France, although rigorous evaluations have not yet 
been undertaken, reports also indicate reductions in demand (Cornelsen and Carreido, 2015). Yet, 
while seemingly straightforward, the effects become complex once we look deeper and wider (Penney 
et al., 2017). How thoroughly do we understand the direct and indirect mechanisms and effects of 
these taxes; not only on health outcomes but also on the wider economy?  In this viewpoint, we 
outline four core questions that require greater engagement from economists in the design and 
evaluation of this health policy intervention to ensure it meets its potential. 
1. Mechanism for behaviour change: price or signalling effect? 
Implementation of soda tax is generally preceded and accompanied with significant debates in the 
media between specialists and advocates from both (public) health and the food industry. The former 
generally focus on the negative health effects of (over) consuming sugar or sodas and its associations 
with obesity and disease; calling for measures such as the tax and suggesting that revenues, if 
earmarked for health, nutrition or education, can yield even greater benefits (Niederdeppe et al., 
2013, Nixon et al., 2015, Elliott-Green et al., 2016, Jeong et al., 2014). The pro-industry coverage 
emphasises the importance of consumer choice, individual responsibility and exercise, disassociates 
the products from negative health outcomes and generally refers to the tax as a regressive measure 
with negative consequences on the poor, jobs and the economy (Niederdeppe et al., 2013, Nixon et 
al., 2015, Elliott-Green et al., 2016).  
The question therefore arises of whether the price increase that the tax eventually causes (which 
could both fall short or exceed the expected value of the tax (Berardi et al., 2016, Falbe et al., 2015, 
Cawley and Frisvold, 2017, Silver et al., 2017, Colchero et al., 2015)), is the main driver for behaviour 
change, such as observed in Berkeley and Mexico, or the framing of the tax as a health (or economy) 
related measure, including in the media, has a significant role?  
For example, a recent study analysing changes in the sales from a voluntary levy on sugary drinks, 
implemented in a chain of 37 restaurants in the UK, found a large reduction in the sales (9.3%) relative 
to a modest increase in price (about 3.5%). However, the levy was supported with different activities, 
including redesigned beverage menu with text explaining why the levy was introduced, new products 
on the drinks menu as well as numerous articles in press and a documentary screened in a national TV 
channel, so it is likely that these other activities also influenced consumer behaviour (Cornelsen et al., 
2017).  
A study reviewing British mainstream media in 2014 found 374 articles published on sugar-sweetened 
beverages (more than one article per day). Of these, 81% suggested that these drinks are unhealthy, 
although only 24% suggested any policy change (Elliott-Green et al., 2016). In the USA, local taxes are 
being voted for in a ballot which is preceded with explicit campaigns on both sides (Paarlberg et al., 
2017) and is likely to raise awareness. Such framing effects are very difficult to measure as the 
information in media appears over time and starts well before a tax is implemented. However, for 
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example, a study of a relatively small, 5% sales tax on soft drinks, unrelated to health (Maine (1991) 
and Ohio (2003)), found no changes in sales arising from this measure (Calantuoni and Rojas, 2015) 
suggesting also that price may not be the only driver.  
A further, related, issue that may determine the effectiveness of the tax is whether, once introduced, 
the tax is signalled to the consumer on the price tag, shelf price or receipt serving as a reminder of the 
tax. There is emerging literature (particularly from the USA) on tax salience suggesting that taxes which 
are posted (signalled) in prices reduce consumption more than increases in sales taxes which are 
added at the register (Chetty et al., 2009, Chen et al., 2015, Zheng et al., 2013). This issue has not been 
extensively studied in the context of soda taxes but it relates back to the design of the taxes and at 
which stage of the supply chain the tax is applied (e.g. if levied on the producer, it is difficult for the 
retailer to know the exact amount to post on the price).  
If taxes indeed are more salient and consumer response stronger when tax is signalled in the posted 
price, there are important implications to revenue collection from the tax. Simply put, if the aim is to 
raise revenue, the tax should not be posted and if the aim is to reduce consumption, the tax should 
be posted and well signalled to the consumer. Contrary to cigarette taxes, the ability of a soda tax to 
raise revenue is already more limited because the own-price elasticity is greater (in absolute terms) 
for sodas (estimated at -0.8 to -1.2 by meta-analyses vs -0.4 to -0.7 for cigarettes (Andreyeva et al., 
2010, Cabrera Escobar et al., 2013, Green et al., 2013, Jha, 2009, Gallet and List, 2003, IARC, 2011)).  
2. Comprehensiveness of the purchasing behaviours: are we getting the full picture? 
When it comes to the effectiveness of soda taxes, evidence stems largely from data collected on 
purchases for at-home consumption (i.e. based on home-scan data). Beyond experimental studies, 
there is little evidence on how a soda tax influences consumer purchases out-of-home; for example in 
work places, cafeterias and (fast-food) restaurants. Consumption in these places can be significant. 
For example, in the USA, consumers’ daily average intake from sodas is 213 kcal, of which 135 kcal 
(74%) is purchased from supermarkets or convenience stores (An and Maurer, 2016) and, likely to be 
consumed at home. A significant minority is consumed at fast-food restaurants, full-service 
restaurants, vending machines and other sources. In the UK, a recent study compared beverage 
consumption by location using the National Diet and Nutrition Survey data from 845 children aged 4-
13. All the children reported beverage consumption at home with average soda intake <25g/day. 
While less than quarter of these children reported consuming any beverages in fast-food or full-service 
restaurants and cafes, the consumption of sodas was highest in these locations (106g/day and 
110g/day, respectively) (Vieux et al., 2017). Going forward it is important to see how soda taxes are 
passed on to consumers in these other purchase locations and how this may affect purchase and 
consumption. Understanding these effects would also help understand how complementary policies, 
such as the ban on vending machines in schools or sales of supersized or fixed-price drinks (e.g. as in 
France) could affect consumption and diets.  
One of the main counterarguments to implementing soda taxes is its regressive nature as low-income 
households tend to consume more of these beverages (Cornelsen and Carreido, 2015). Because of 
lower incomes it is likely, however, that low-income consumers are also more responsive to changes 
in prices so presumably they would also reduce consumption relatively more (Wada et al., 2015), but 
whether that carries through to proportionally higher health benefits is yet to be demonstrated.  
To understand the health effects it is crucial to understand if soda taxes have a broader effect on 
purchase decisions beyond the taxed products (Cornelsen et al., 2014). Are there substitution, 
complementarity or budget effects towards untaxed beverages, other sugary products (e.g. 
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confectionary, biscuits, chocolates, desserts) and healthier foods, such as fruits or vegetables? The 
existing evaluations from Mexico and Berkley that looked at untaxed beverage alternatives suggest 
some substitution towards water (see table 2), but broader evaluations of the effects of implemented 
taxes, exploring substitution within the full food basket (including in longer run) remain to be done.  
3. What is the impact of incentivising reformulation versus reduced consumption? 
In comparison to taxes implemented thus far in Mexico, France, and in parts of the USA, some recent 
proposed taxes fundamentally differ, and are more complex. For example, the sugary drinks levy 
proposed in the UK, has tax rates set at different levels depending on the sugar content in the 
beverages, and the objective is not to reduce soda purchases per se but to reduce the consumption of 
sugar through giving companies incentives to “remove added sugar, promote diet drinks, and reduce 
portion sizes for high sugar drinks” as drinks containing less sugar will be taxed at a lower rate or not 
at all (HM Treasury, 2016a).  
And while sodas with high sugar content, in the UK for example, comprise about half of the soft-drinks 
market, the mid-range category (subject to a smaller levy), is growing and the industry is keen to show 
its efforts at reformulating (BSDA, 2017). In the anticipation of a number of these efforts, UK 
government has already had to reduce expectations of revenues raised (Daneshku, 2017). Another 
uncertainty is whether or not the tax is passed through to the price of sodas, as it is levied upon the 
producer, not the retailer, who can apply different pricing strategies to its entire product portfolio. 
This includes changing the prices of non-taxed products also, depending on their projections of 
consumer demand and price responsiveness.  
In evaluating the possible economic impact of such multi-tiered taxes, and/or those targeted at 
producers not consumers, we need to consider several scenarios that account for product 
reformulation and replacement, price increases of taxed products and untaxed alternatives, as well as 
the wider redistributive effects in the economy. In this respect, a useful comparison could be made 
between the effects observed in Catalonia where taxes are two-tiered but mandatory for retailers to 
pass it on to consumers (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017), versus the UK or Ireland where the planned 
taxes will be levied on producers and pass-through to prices left to the discretion of the 
manufacturers.  
4. What is the impact on the economy more widely?  
Even if prices do increase for certain drinks, and their consumption falls as a consequence, the 
economic impact is ambiguous at best, given substitution patterns across drink and food. Media 
coverage of soda taxes include threats by the industry of the negative consequences on jobs and 
company tax revenues from reduced demand (Oxford Economics, 2016). However, much of this 
debate – on both sides – misses the critical point that even if we do not know on what exactly, it is 
likely that the money not spent on soft drinks will be spent on other products (be it beverages or food). 
If the price of soda increases following a tax and consumers substitute to, say, water that is produced 
by same producer, revenues simply shift rather than fall away (Richardson, 2016). Similarly, if 
consumers now have three beers rather than two beers and one cola, bar and restaurant revenues 
might actually increase (and of course health may not).Therefore, redistributive effects, both within 
the drinks industry and related businesses and across the food and drinks industry at large are likely 
to occur, albeit possibly only over time.  
We also need to look beyond the food and drink industry and consider the wider economy. In the case 
of the UK levy, the policy also refers to increasing investment in physical activity interventions and 
healthy school-meals for children. In this case, there may be increased employment in the physical 
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activity sector, and the associated publicity may further increase demand for health-club membership, 
trainers or sports equipment (Penney et al., 2017).  
Finally, a dimension to consider is geographical effects. For example, the localised taxes in the USA, in 
relatively small jurisdictions, are likely to see at least some level of increased “cross-border” shopping 
which in turn will affect tax pass through rates and revenues collected (Cawley and Frisvold, 2017). Is 
there an optimal geographical spread and magnitude of the tax that would avoid this? More globally, 
if taxes do work and consumption falls in countries where this measure has been adopted, are we 
pushing the problem to other markets, particularly those in lower-middle income countries with large 
growth potential for these types of beverages (Euromonitor Passport, 2015, Goryakin et al., 2017, 
Roache and Gostin, 2017)?  There are lessons to learn here perhaps from the stricter tobacco control 
policies in high-income countries being associated with increased marketing and consumption in low- 
and middle-income countries (Savell et al., 2015). 
Conclusion: what economists need to analyse 
To address the issues above, there are numerous aspects surrounding soda taxes that have or are 
about to be implemented that urgently need input from the economics discipline to: 
 Continue to thoroughly assess the impact of soda taxes, on purchases of both taxed and non-taxed 
products, including by income gradient and beyond the immediate geographical boundaries of the 
tax; 
 Study the substitution effects in greater detail, using alternative approaches to demand analysis 
where aggregation of products may mask important patterns; 
 Understand the mechanisms of change in current, implemented, taxes and the role of framing the 
taxes through media debates (or ballots as in the US) and its (synergistic) effects in combination 
with price changes; 
 Conduct a wider analysis of both direct and indirect costs and benefits on the economy arising 
from the taxes, including arising from reformulation efforts.  
In sum, soda taxes are becoming a defining economic intervention within public health, targeting large 
populations and perhaps second only to measures implemented in limiting consumption of tobacco 
in the past decades. However, understanding the economic mechanisms and impacts has been scarce 
while the taxes are now being rapidly implemented without a real consideration of the likely causal 
and spillover effects in food systems and economy.  If this major economic intervention is to achieve 
its potential, then it urgently requires economists to be involved in grappling with these critical 
questions.  
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Table 1. Planned and recently implemented soda taxes  
Country Date Details 
Planned   
United 
Kingdom 
April 2018 Two-tiered levy on producers of sugary beverages. Tax rates are £0.18/L for drinks 
containing 5-8g of sugar/100ml and £0.24 for drinks containing >8g of sugar/100ml; 
revenues earmarked for school sports and educational programs (HM Treasury, 2016b) 
Ireland April 2018 Follows proposals of the UK levy (above). Tax rates will are €0.2/L for drinks containing 
5-8g of sugar/100ml and €0.3 for drinks containing >8g of sugar/100ml  (Department of 
Finance, 2016) 
Seattle  
(US) 
Jan 2018 1.75-cent tax on sodas, sports drinks, energy drinks and other sweet drinks (distributors 
pay tax) (2017, Norimine, 2017). 
San Francisco 
(US) 
Jan 2018  1-cent per fluid ounce excise tax on the distribution of sugar-sweetened beverages  
Excludes milk products, 100% juice, diet drinks (Treasurer&Tax Collector, 2017). 
Delayed    
Estonia Intended 
Jan 2018; 
delayed 
Two-tiered levy on producers of sugary beverages. Tax rates are €0.1/L for drinks 
containing artificial sweeteners, juices with no added sugar or added sugar up to 
8g/100ml; €0.3/L for drinks with > 8g of sugar/100ml. To allow for reformulation the 
€0.3 rate was initially set with a threshold of 10g of sugar/100ml (2018), then 9g (2019) 
and 8g by 2020 (Veerman and Thai, 2017, WHO, 2017, ERR, 2017). 
South Africa  Intended 
April 2017; 
delayed 
Implementation of the tax has been delayed and lower, revised tax rates introduced. 
Tax applies to sweetened beverages with > 4g of sugar/100ml (including pure fruit 
juices); tax rate is 2.1c per g of sugar in each 100ml beyond 4g/100ml (National 
Treasury Republic of South Africa, 2016, National Treasury Republic of South Africa, 
2017). 
Implemented since 2015 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Oct 2017 50% tax on carbonated drinks, 100% tax on energy drinks (Burki, 2017, WCRF, 2017). 
Thailand Sept 2017 Excise tax levied on sugar-sweetened beverages over 6-year phased period to 
encourage reformulation. Tax rates to be announced; drinks divided into five categories 
based on sugar content per 100g: below 6g, 6-10g, more than 10-14g, more than 14-
18g and more than 18g (Chantanusornsiri, 2017, Jitpleecheep, 2017).  
Cook County, 
IL (US) 
August 
2017; 
Repealed 
Oct 2017 
1-cent per ounce tax on sugar-sweetened beverages sold at retail in the County. 
Exclusions include milk products, 100% juice, diet drinks. The distributor or retailer 
must include the tax in the sale price of the sweetened beverages (Cook County 
Government, 2017). 
Boulder, CO 
(US) 
July 2017 2-cent per fluid ounce of sugar-sweetened beverage product excise tax on the 
distributors of the beverages (containing at least 5g of added caloric sweetener per 12 
ounce) (City of Boulder, 2017). 
Oakland, CA 
(US) 
July 2017 1-cent per fluid ounce excise tax on the distribution of sugar-sweetened beverages 
containing at least 2kcal/ounce. Milk based beverages and beverages with non-caloric 
sweeteners are exempt (City of Oakland, 2016). 
Saudi Arabia June 2017 50% tax on carbonated drinks, 100% tax on energy drinks (WCRF, 2017) 
Albany, CA  
(US) 
April 2017 1-cent per fluid ounce excise tax on the distribution of sugar-sweetened beverages 
(defined as containing at least 2kcal per ounce and added sweetener). Exclusions 
include milk products, 100% juice, diet drinks (City of Albany, 2017). 
Catalonia 
(Spain) 
April 2017 Two-tiered tax on drinks that contain added caloric sweeteners. Tax rates are €0.08/L 
for drinks with 5-8g of sugar per 100ml, €0.12 for drinks with >8g of sugar per 100ml. 
Tax is mandatory to pass through to sales prices (Baquero, 2017, Agencia Tributaria de 
Catalunya, 2017, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017) 
Brunei April 2017 Excise duty of (~$0.28/L) of SSBs with >6g of total sugar per 100ml (WCRF, 2017)  
Portugal Feb 2017 Special Consumption Tax (VAT). Drinks with <8g of sugar/100ml are taxed at €8.2 per 
100L, and drinks with >8g of sugar/100 ml are taxed at €16.46 per 100L. Milk based 
beverages and natural juices are excluded from the tax. Revenues are earmarked for 
National Health Service (Agence France-Presse, 2016, The Portugal News Online, 2017, 
Autoridade Tributaria e Aduaneira, 2017). 
Philadelphia 
(US) 
Jan 2017 1.5-cents per ounce excise tax on distributors of sugar-sweetened beverages. Tax 
excludes milk products, 100% juice, diet drinks (City of Philadelphia, 2017). 
Dominica Sep 2015 10% excise tax to drinks with high sugar content  
Barbados Sep 2015 10% excise tax on sugar sweetened beverages (Alvarado et al., 2017). 
Mauritius Oct 2016 Excise tax of ~$0.08 per 100g of sugar content in beverages containing sugar, including 
juices, milk based beverages and soft drinks (WCRF, 2017).  
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Belgium Jan 2016 Excise tax (€0.068/L) on all non-alcoholic beverages with added sugar or sweeteners 
(WCRF, 2017). 
Berkley, CA 
(US) 
Jan 2015  1-cent per fluid ounce excise tax on the distribution of sugar-sweetened beverages 
(containing 2 or more calories per ounce of beverage with added caloric sweetener. Tax 
excludes milk products, 100% juice, diet drinks (City of Berkeley, 2017). 
Chile Jan 2015 Two-tiered ad-valorem tax on sweetened beverages. An existing 13% tax rate was 
increased to 18% for high-sugar drinks (> 6.25g of sugar/100ml) and reduced to 10% for 
drinks below the threshold (WCRF, 2017). 
 
Table 2. Impact of soda taxes on purchases and consumption of beverages 
Country Study Data Findings 
UK (voluntary 
levy on sugary 
drinks in a 
restaurant chain) 
(Cornelsen 
et al., 2017) 
Number of beverages sold 
per customer using 
electronic point of sale 
data records (37 individual 
restaurants) 
At 12-weeks post-levy sales were 11% lower in 
comparison to 12-weeks pre-levy and at 6-months 
post-levy, sales were 9% lower. Effects were larger in 
restaurants with higher baseline purchases of sugary 
drinks.  
Mexico (8% tax 
on foods high in 
sugar, salt and 
fat; peso-per-
litre tax on SSB) 
(Batis et al., 
2016) 
Urban household (n=6,248) 
expenditures on taxed 
foods, evaluated one year 
post-tax 
5.1% reduction in purchases of taxed foods (10.2% in 
low-SES, 5.8% in mid-SES and no change in high-SES 
households); no change in purchases of non-taxed 
products. 
(Colchero 
et al., 2016) 
Urban household (n=6,253) 
expenditures on SSBs one 
year post-tax 
6.1% reduction in sales (9.1% among low-SES and 5.5% 
among mid- and high-SES households). 4% increase in 
purchases of non-taxed beverages (mainly water). 
(Barrientos-
Gutierrez 
et al., 2017) 
Estimation of health 
impacts using Markov 
modelling based on 
(Colchero et al. 2016) 
estimates of reduction in 
beverage purchases  
Tax modelled to lead to a 2.5% reduction in obesity 10 
years post implementation; tax estimated to prevent 
86-134K cases of diabetes. 
(Colchero 
et al., 
2017b) 
Urban household (n=6,645) 
expenditures on SSBs two 
years post-tax 
Average reduction of purchases of taxed products was 
6.7% in 2014 and 9.7% in 2015. Over the two years, 
average increase in purchases of untaxed beverages 
by 2.1%. 
 (Colchero 
et al., 
2017a) 
National Income and 
Expenditure Survey (4 
rounds) (n=75,954 
households) 
An average of 6.3% reduction in the observed 
purchases of SSBs in 2014 in comparison to expected 
purchases based on trends from 2008-2012. 
Reductions were higher among low-income 
households, in urban areas and households with 
children. A 16% increase in purchases of water 
observed among low- and middle income households. 
Berkley (penny-
per-ounce of 
SSBs) 
(Falbe et 
al., 2016)  
Pre- (n=990) and post-
implementation (n=1689) 
survey  of  self-reported 
changes in consumption  
21% reduction in consumption of taxed beverages; 
63% increase in consumption of water. 
(Silver et 
al., 2017) 
Electronic point-of-sale 
data (15.5m price 
observations), telephone 
surveys of (n=957) 
consumers  
9.6% reduction in purchases of taxed beverages, and 
increased purchases of non-taxed beverages by 3.5%  
(water 15.6%, juice 3.4%, milk 0.6%); no change in self-
reported intake of SSBs but increased intake of 
calories from  dairy-based drinks. 
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